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ABSTRACT: The longstanding debate about the power of the British prime minister 
has focused excessively on formal instruments of control exercised within Whitehall. 
By contrast, not enough attention has been paid to the ways in which prime ministers 
use rhetoric, formally and informally, to maintain themselves in power and to achieve 
their policy aims. The term ‘rhetorical premiership’ is used here to denote the 
collection of methods by which prime ministers since 1945 have used public speech 
to augment their formal powers. Set-piece oratory remained consistently important 
throughout the period, in spite of new technology and the rise of the sound-bite. 
However, parliamentary rhetoric underwent some important changes, and prime 
ministers spoke outside the Commons with increased frequency. Historians of the 
premiership should draw instruction from those scholars who have studied the 
rhetoric of US presidents, although caution must be exercised when drawing 
comparisons. Future study of the rhetorical premiership should involve close textual 
analysis of prime ministerial speeches, but this should not be at the expense of 
archival sources, from which important insights into the speech-making process can 
be gleaned. 
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For many years, the debate about the nature and extent of prime ministerial power 
was dominated by two alternative models. In 1963, Richard Crossman made the 
famous suggestion that ‘the post-war epoch has seen the final transformation of 
Cabinet Government into Prime Ministerial Government.’ Developing arguments 
made previously by others, he claimed that the prime minister’s control of patronage 
and of the cabinet agenda, already amounting to ‘near-Presidential powers’, had been 
progressively increased by the centralisation of the party machine and of government 
bureaucracy.
1
 This perspective is well summed up by the title of Michael Foley’s The 
Rise of the British Presidency (1993). The other point of view, often called the 
‘chairmanship’ model, was advanced by G.W. Jones, who wrote that the prime 
minister ‘is not the all powerful individual which many have recently claimed him to 
be. […] A Prime Minister who can carry his colleagues with him can be in a very 
powerful position, but he is only as strong as they let him be.’2 In the 1990s, a more 
rounded approach to the problem emerged. This emphasised that senior actors in 
government do not possess and deploy a fixed stock of power are mutually 
interdependent; their power depends on context, circumstance and the use that they 
make of their varying resources.
3
 Yet although it reflected a much more sophisticated 
approach to the problem, this development did not expand the scope of the debate 
beyond the machinery of government and the functions of the core executive. This 
article suggests that more attention needs to be paid to the public role of the Prime 
Minister and in particular to the rhetorical functions of the office. Any occupant of 10 
Downing Street needs not only to operate the levers of bureaucracy and party, but also 
to present themselves, through various forms of rhetoric, as a party and above all 
national leader. This phenomenon, to which scholars of the recent past have paid 
insufficient attention, may be designated ‘the rhetorical premiership’. 
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The inspiration for this idea lies in the concept of ‘the rhetorical presidency’, 
pioneered by Jeffrey Tulis and others in the context of the United States. Tulis saw a 
strong contrast between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He argued that 
whereas earlier presidents had been reticent in their use of oral communication, ‘Since 
the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, popular or mass 
rhetoric has become a principal tool of presidential governance. […] Today it is taken 
for granted that presidents have a duty constantly to defend themselves publicly, to 
promote policy initiatives nationwide, and to inspirit the population.’4 The same could 
be said about the role of British Prime Ministers. One could even argue that the ‘duty’ 
of public rhetoric is taken more for granted in Britain than in America. For, whereas 
in the USA the phenomenon of presidential rhetoric is the subject of intense study, in 
Britain the issue of why prime ministers speak in public, and what they hope to 
achieve by doing so, is undoubtedly neglected. The same can be said about the recent 
history of rhetoric in British public life in general. Indeed, many who write about 
political language often appear hostile to the very concept of rhetoric. They take the 
term, which has long held very negative connotations, to mean ‘just empty words’, a 
contrast to ‘substance’.5 
 
There are exceptions. H.C.G. Matthew’s short survey of developments in the 1860-
1950 period was an important attempt to reclaim rhetoric as ‘an essential concomitant 
of representative politics’ and to describe the conditions that facilitated its exercise in 
the great era of the mass meeting. He believed, though, that the healthy late-Victorian 
rhetorical culture had in the end wilted in the face of new political and technological 
developments.
6
 Philip Williamson’s study of Stanley Baldwin, which focuses on his 
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use of public language in order to engage with the electorate, is another notable 
contribution.
7
 Unsurprisingly, Churchill’s rhetoric has also received considerable 
attention.
8
 Within the literature on prime ministerial power, two contributions stand 
out. Dunleavy et al carried out a pioneering empirical analysis of patterns of prime 
ministerial speech in parliament. They demonstrate a long-term decline in prime 
ministerial activity in the Commons and conclude that this has led to a decline in 
accountability. Implicitly, they argue that prime ministers have increased their own 
powers (through the avoidance of scrutiny) by speaking less; they do not consider any 
positive benefits that may accrue to prime ministers from public speaking, nor do they 
consider speech outside parliament.
9
 Foley, by contrast, does engage with the 
phenomenon of politicians ‘going public’ – that is, cultivating public opinion via 
personal appearances, TV interviews, speeches, and so forth.
10
 His observations about 
the increased tendency of prime ministers to do this, which in his view support his 
‘presidentialisation’ thesis, undoubtedly have some validity. There remains 
considerable further scope, however, to assess the role of prime ministerial speech, 
and to examine the ways in which post-war premiers have used rhetoric to augment 
the power of the office. As Alan Finlayson has observed, ‘At the very least we have to 
acknowledge that politics under democratic constitutions is about some people trying 
to persuade the rest of us of their virtues or the virtues of their political position.’11 
Yet for post-1945 prime ministers, rhetorical analysis – explicitly conceived as such – 
is in short supply, notwithstanding some interesting if rather narrowly-focussed work 
from within the discipline of linguistics.
12
 Although it can only scratch the surface of 
what is potentially an enormous field of study, this article is intended to help remedy 
that deficiency.  
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It will argue that the scholarly neglect of modern British political rhetoric is a product 
of the questionable assumption that rhetoric has declined as an art form, having fallen 
victim, in consequence of technical innovation, to the age of the sound-bite. In fact, it 
will be argued here, the set-piece prime-ministerial speech has remained surprisingly 
important up to the present day. The impact of technology, so often demonized, has 
not always been negative or uniform.
13
 The article will also highlight some key 
features of the rhetorical premiership, and how it changed over time. Its evolution was 
conditioned not solely by technology, nor by the rhetorical characteristics of 
individual prime ministers, but by institutional and cultural factors. This can be 
illustrated by comparison with the rhetorical presidency in the United States, with 
which it shares some but by no means all features. Finally, the article will suggest an 
agenda for future research, and offer some methodological pointers regarding how the 
rhetorical premiership should be studied in the future. 
 
Frequency of prime ministerial speech since 1945  
Before examining how rhetoric acts as weapon in the prime minister’s armoury, we 
need to consider long-term trends in the practice of British political rhetoric. 
Matthew’s account focused on extra-parliamentary speechmaking. In the culture he 
described, politicians made ‘long, serious, detailed, well-informed’ speeches to public 
meetings. These speeches were then relayed to a wider public via lengthy (and often 
verbatim) reports in the newspapers. This, made possible by new technology such as 
the telegraph, in turn facilitated great national debates, often conducted over periods 
of several weeks. Later, however, modernity played a less benign role, as Matthew 
saw it. In response to the growth of the popular press and the advertising techniques 
associated with it, speeches were increasingly ‘packaged for consumption’ by 
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journalists as reporting of them was cut back. In this analysis, the mature, rationalistic 
processes of debate were further damaged by the rise of radio, film and television.
14
 
Many commentators on post-1945 political communication appear to share this view. 
Television, it is suggested, undermines eloquence and reasoned argument, using 
spectacle and imagery to pander to the viewers’ short attention-spans.15 The effect on 
oratory is often seen as fundamentally sinister: ‘Political speeches […] delivered in 
the pseudo-event environment of a televised party conference, attempt to satisfy the 
journalists’ needs for easily-reportable “bits” of political information, in such a way 
as to set the news agenda in the politicians’ favour.’16  
 
This negative picture requires some qualification, especially when the whole period is 
considered. Early on, film and broadcasting did allow politicians to deliver sustained 
arguments to voters unmediated by editorial interference. During the 1945 election, 
Labour and the Conservatives were allowed ten broadcasts each, of between twenty 
and thirty minutes, which reached on average 45% of the population.
17
 These 
broadcasts were also transcribed in the press, sometimes with a degree of journalistic 
interference.
18
 It was estimated that Churchill’s election film shown in the cinemas (a 
speech delivered straight to camera) would be viewed by 20 million people; 
presumably a similar number saw Attlee’s.19 This meant that many more people had a 
chance of actually hearing what they were saying than in the days when politicians 
relied on mass meetings alone. As Matthew himself shows, although Victorian and 
Edwardian meetings might be attended by thousands, the more people turned up the 
less likely it was that all of them would find the speeches audible; and not all of those 
who missed out can have read the reports the next day.
20
 Moreover, the advent of 
television in time brought more sophisticated political coverage than that to be found 
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in the bland packages provided by the newsreel companies; nor did the introduction of 
televised campaigning in 1959 instantly kill off the mass meeting. (The watershed 
appears to have occurred during the 1970s.)
21
 During the 1964 election, Wilson 
successfully combined the mass meeting with the exploitation of TV. At the point 
during his nightly speeches when he knew that he was being broadcast live on the 
evening news, he would switch to a prepared passage that he was determined to get 
across to the nation.
22
 Although improvements in editing technology made it easier 
for broadcasters to fillet speeches to suit their own convenience, live broadcasting of 
some major events, such as party leaders’ conference speeches, did continue. 
Tolerably full parliamentary coverage in the broadsheets continued into the 1980s, 
although the eventual televising of the Commons may have been the death-blow. 
Later on, however, transcripts of parliamentary speeches were easily available from 
the Hansard website, and the texts of other speeches were often posted on newspaper, 
party or government sites. The rise of video-sharing websites now makes it possible to 
view many speeches online,
23
 and true aficionados can watch BBC Parliament, 
launched in 1998.
24
 Arguably, it is easier for those who wish to do so to access 
politicians’ rhetoric today than at any previous time, even if the interaction is 
electronic rather than face-to-face. 
 
Against this background, we must examine how patterns of prime ministerial 
speaking have changed. Tables 1 and 2 offer a snapshot of the speeches of each post-
war prime minister during a single month – the March of the year after they entered 
Downing Street.
25
 (March was selected as a month during which parliament was 
always sitting.) Any such snapshot must of course be treated with caution. 
Furthermore, the parliamentary data is compiled using a prototype Hansard website 
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which uses potentially problematic character-recognition software. The extra-
parliamentary data is substantially compiled using articles in The Times, which may 
not, of course, have reported all instances of prime ministerial speech, and which 
almost certainly became less likely to do so over time. Nevertheless, we may have 
some confidence in the broad picture that emerges, especially given that it confirms 
that established by Dunleavy et al for parliamentary speech in the period to 1990.
 26
 
[Table 1] 
Table 1 Column 1 shows the number of separate days within the month on which the 
prime minister spoke in the Commons. By the end of the period there is a marked 
decline in this figure, doubtless attributable in part to the shift under Tony Blair to a 
weekly rather than bi-weekly basis for prime minister’s question time. This may lend 
weight to the case that the importance of parliament has declined, although this should 
be qualified with reference to Column 2, which shows the number of oral 
contributions each prime minister made within the month. This, it should be noted, is 
a very crude measure: for these purposes a contribution is any discrete body of text, 
possibly even a single word. A speech that was interrupted several times by other 
MPs would therefore count as several contributions. This should not matter for the 
purposes of comparison, unless there was reason to think that some prime ministers 
were interrupted significantly more than others. (However, it is emphatically not a 
measure of the length of time for which the prime ministers were actually speaking, 
for which a precise calculation is probably impossible.) The figures show a marked 
increase in contributions in the later 1950s; Macmillan spoke nearly twice as often as 
Attlee and Churchill did. A high-point was reached during the Wilson-Heath-
Callaghan era. A decline followed, although neither Thatcher nor Blair fell back to the 
level of Eden, and both Major and Brown contributed roughly as often as Macmillan 
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did. It would seem that the changes can be explained by later prime ministers 
answering more parliamentary questions than the early ones, whilst making fewer set-
piece debating speeches.
27
 
 
The evolution of prime minister’s question-time, indeed, was the key development in 
terms of the parliamentary rhetoric of the period. A fixed time for prime minister’s 
questions was adopted in 1961, following the report of a select committee on 
procedure two years earlier. (Prior to this, questions to the prime minister came quite 
far down the order paper, so that sometimes only one or two were answered before the 
hour allocated to questions had elapsed.) In the Home-Wilson period the institution 
quickly developed its modern characteristic as a ‘duel’ in which the prime minister 
and the leader of the opposition vied with each other in systematic impoliteness.
28
 It is 
notable that this occurred significantly before the start of regular radio broadcasts 
from parliament in 1978 and the televising of the Commons in 1989. The new 
character of the exchanges may have been driven by the quest for favourable press 
coverage, but it cannot be blamed on broadcasting technology. 
[Table 2] 
Table 2 shows trends in prime ministerial speech outside the Commons. Spoken 
remarks are included whether trivial or otherwise; brief, off-the-cuff comments made 
to journalists will count as an ‘episode’, as will a formal interview or a set-piece 
speech. Written statements and published letters and articles are excluded. It is clear 
that, throughout the 1940s and 1950s, prime ministers were quite restrained in terms 
of how often they spoke outside parliament. Churchill went for the whole of the 
surveyed month without doing so at all; this is probably explained by his age and state 
of health at the time. Douglas-Home was very loquacious by comparison with his 
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predecessors, which may partly be explained by the fact that 1964, unlike any of the 
others examined here, was an election year. (His tally included five whistle-stop 
speeches made during a tour of the South-West; he had originally intended to make 
more.) Wilson, perhaps surprisingly, appears to have reverted to previous practice. 
There was, however, an increase under Heath, more or less sustained under 
Callaghan. There was a further increase under Thatcher, the data here being gathered 
from the seemingly comprehensive Thatcher Foundation website.
29
 (Her former 
speechwriter Ferdinand Mount comments: ‘It is interesting in retrospect to note how 
few “political” speeches she gave each year, compared with the never-ending roster 
Tony Blair submitted himself to.’)30 The figures for Major and Blair, compiled from 
The Times, may well be too low, as a consequence of under-reporting.
31
 This may be 
guessed from the minimal coverage of Brown’s remarks in The Times in contrast to 
that on the Downing Street website, from which twenty-two separate sets of remarks 
can be gleaned.
32
 (The paper did, however, report one speech to the Scottish Labour 
conference which, like all ‘political’ speeches, was excluded from the Downing Street 
site.) It is also possible, though, that Brown has genuinely been more rhetorically 
active than Major and Blair. It is clear that he, like other recent prime ministers, has 
not been able to rely on substantial direct press reporting of their words, and his high 
levels of extra-parliamentary speech may reflect a scattergun approach aimed at 
overcoming this.  
 
Changes in audiences addressed 
It is also interesting to note changes in the contexts in which prime ministers spoke. 
Given the limited number of times that the early prime ministers spoke within a 
month, one would need to survey a more substantial period in order to make a formal 
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quantitative analysis meaningful. There are, however, some interesting indications to 
be derived from the existing data. (The following remarks apply to the snapshot 
period only; that is to say, for example, that although it was Macmillan who was the 
first prime minister to give a TV interview, such an interview does not appear in our 
survey before 1971.) Out of all the prime ministers, only Attlee made a formal 
ministerial broadcast (on radio). Some of the later premiers’ speeches reported in The 
Times may also have been televised, but it was not until Heath that a TV interview 
with a prime minister was reported. Callaghan appeared on TV too, in a Nationwide 
programme billed as the first televised Q & A session with a British prime minister, 
with the public contributing questions.
33
 Douglas-Home is the first of our prime 
ministers to be reported as giving a press conference. Gordon Brown is the first 
reported to have been interviewed by schoolchildren. Speeches at public luncheons or 
banquets, a common feature in the 1940s and 1950s, fell somewhat out of favour 
thereafter. There were also some significant continuities. All the prime ministers 
except Callaghan, Major and Churchill (the latter of whom did not speak at all) spoke 
at some kind of party event. Several of them spoke abroad. Thatcher’s activity can be 
taken as a fair proxy of the pattern that had become fairly constant by the end of the 
century: during the month, she gave one lecture, two speeches at party events, one 
speech at a formal dinner at a conference in Germany, one joint press conference with 
the West German chancellor, two TV interviews, two interviews for publication, 
made one party-political broadcast, and made three minor sets of remarks to 
journalists.  
 
Of course many, if not all, speeches are delivered in effect to multiple audiences. This 
tendency is particularly acute with modern party conference speeches, because the 
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audience of party activists within the hall may have a very different agenda to that of 
the mainstream voter watching on TV. The leader needs to target both, attempting to 
get a warm reception from the physical audience that will look good on the news, 
whilst also presenting to the outside world an image as a ‘national’ rather than a party 
leader. Prime ministers may choose to lecture their parties, as in Callaghan’s 1976 
warning about trying to ‘spend your way out of recession’: ‘I tell you in all candour 
that that option no longer exists’.34 Thatcher’s famous ‘lady’s not for turning speech’ 
of 1980 distanced her from only a part of her party: the Heathite wing that wanted her 
to change her economic course. Blair’s conference speeches as prime minister were 
replete were replete with a delicious tension. On the one hand, he cheered Labour 
party members with reminders of his government’s political successes. On the other, 
he repeatedly pointed out that these had only been achieved by the sacrifice of many 
of the nostrums that his listeners had themselves held dear. ‘Tony’s assumption is that 
he loses his unique appeal if he becomes just another Labour leader who the party are 
comfortable with’, suggests former Blair speechwriter Peter Hyman. Hyman also 
argues that the purpose of the conference speech is to ‘gain momentum’, setting the 
political agenda in order to prevent media and Opposition criticism from gaining a 
toehold.
35
 
 
Functions of prime-ministerial rhetoric 
The capacity of the lengthy set-piece speech to serve different audiences may help 
explain its survival into the media age. On the face of it, this is surprising, if it is true 
media and voter attention-spans have become shorter in the face of new technology. It 
is certainly true that (even though the text and video footage could be posted online) a 
prime minister’s speech was very much less likely to receive full traditional media 
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coverage in 2009 than in 1945; so why bother to continue to deliver lengthy orations 
at all? It is at this point that we need to consider the functions of the rhetorical 
premiership, that is to say, the differing ways in which public speech can be used to 
enhance a prime minister’s power. 
 
The first function, of course, is helping an individual to become prime minister in the 
first place. Although Attlee’s reputation does not rest on his rhetorical skill, he could 
be a very effective speaker. His calm and measured broadcast response to Churchill’s 
notorious ‘Gestapo’ gibe is widely credited with helping him win the 1945 election. 
Douglas-Home owed his surprise elevation to the premiership in 1963 in part to a 
strong party conference speech, which was rapturously received. The counterpart of 
this was the failure of the speeches his rivals, R.A. Butler and Reginald Maudling; at 
the same time, many thought that the supporters of another contender, Quintin Hogg, 
were too enthusiastic, and that Hogg himself played up to this in an undignified 
way.
36
 John Major, like Douglas-Home, won the premiership between general 
elections, but when successfully fighting to retain it in 1992, he bolstered his image as 
a man of the people by addressing crowds from a soap-box. The prime purpose of 
this, of course, was to get TV channels to broadcast excerpts of his reception by the 
crowds; but this would hardly have been so successful had he merely performed a 
series of ‘bits’ for the cameras rather than engaging in a sustained way with his 
immediate audience. Jon Lawrence has shown how Major turned even hostile crowds 
to his advantage by depicting the protesters as ‘the ugly, intolerant face of the Labour 
Party’.37 Although Major himself thought that the soapbox might, in a close-fought 
election, have swung at least one marginal, we must be cautious about its effect on the 
outcome as a whole. The electorate’s doubts about Labour’s economic competence 
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probably outweighed other factors and, in terms of public speaking, Neil Kinnock’s 
misjudged performance at his party’s Sheffield rally may have been at least as 
significant as Major’s more successful efforts. But the experience certainly 
invigorated Major himself, and he recalled that ‘for me it worked to infinitely better 
effect than any toothpaste photo-opportunity could have done.’38 
 
When in power between general elections, prime ministers still need to use rhetoric in 
order to stay there. During Churchill’s second premiership of 1951-5, many of his 
senior colleagues became increasingly desperate for him to retire. After his stroke in 
1953, he used speeches, at which he could still sparkle, to demonstrate that he was 
still up to the job. ‘Churchill’s performance on Nov 3rd was really remarkable’, noted 
Macmillan in his diary that year, adding: ‘he was complete master of himself and of 
the House. It seems incredible that this man was struck down by a second stroke at the 
beginning of July.’39 Wilson and Callaghan’s strong Commons performances against 
Thatcher helped preserve their respective governments in the face of weak or non-
existent majorities. They did not need so much to persuade their own MPs of the 
merits of their policies as inspire them to keep going through the arduous 
parliamentary battles.  
 
Nominally, of course, ministerial speeches in the Commons are supposed to lay out a 
case for whatever measure or motion is at hand. Yet it is difficult to think of very 
many cases since 1945 when MPs minds have been changed by the course of debate 
in sufficient numbers to make a difference to the outcome. The 1986 Westland affair 
is, perhaps, one example, although Thatcher’s survival then was due not so much to 
her own strong performance in debate but to the weak speech by the leader of the 
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opposition, Neil Kinnock. Another example may be Blair’s March 2003 Commons 
speech in favour of the imminent war with Iraq, which, contemporary media reports 
suggested, helped sway the views of wavering MPs. For example, The Economist 
observed: ‘Had many MPs not already promised their constituency parties that they 
would vote for the anti-war amendment if there was no second [UN] resolution, the 
rebellion might have been smaller.’40 It is of course very difficult to isolate the effect 
of a single speech on a parliamentary vote; Blair’s private efforts to persuade MPs and 
the efforts of the whips surely had an impact too. On this particular occasion, Blair 
knew at the outset that he would win the formal vote, given that the Conservatives had 
already pledged their support. What his fluent performance may have helped avoid – 
although this cannot be proven conclusively - was the humiliation of having to rely on 
the Tory votes in order to do so.  
 
 
Prime ministers, if they wish to remain such, need to massage their support 
continually, even when no landmark debate is on the horizon. Speeches to the 
parliamentary Labour party (PLP) or the Conservative 1922 committee assist with this 
process. The meetings of these bodies are not open to the public or to journalists, but 
they may often be described as ‘semi-public’ because it is likely that accounts will 
appear in the newspapers. Thatcher’s famous description of the miners’ leaders as ‘the 
enemy within’ was made to a supposedly ‘private meeting’ of the 1922 committee; as 
was doubtless intended, her speech was reported quite fully in The Times the next 
day.
41
 Tony Blair’s regular and consistently good-humoured performances before the 
PLP suggest that he understood well how to damp down back-bench dissent.
42
 Such 
occasions could be used to address specific concerns. In the early 1950s, Conservative 
unrest over negotiations with Egypt led to a stormy backbench gathering; the Chief 
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Whip summoned Churchill who (in spite of his own doubts on the issue) carried the 
meeting in favour of the government line.
43
  
 
Of greater national prominence are the annual conference speeches that prime 
ministers give in their capacity as the leaders of their parties. (There are also various 
other party functions to speak at: women’s conferences, Scottish conferences, and so 
forth.) These, of course, were not a new phenomenon in the post-war period. Ramsay 
MacDonald’s clash with Oswald Mosley at the 1930 Labour Party conference was 
over a substantive point of policy, that is, how to deal with unemployment. (The 
prime minister’s reassuring speech helped him win the day narrowly.) More normally, 
prime ministers offer a tour d’horizon and some jabs at the opposition: during 
Wilson’s first premiership, a standing ovation at the end started to become part of the 
ritual.
44
 Yet although there is rarely anything specific immediately at stake prime 
ministers tend to treat these occasions with great seriousness. One of Thatcher’s 
speechwriters, the playwright Ronald Millar, described them as ‘the highlight and 
hazard of the political year’. He recalled: ‘Whenever I was asked how it got written I 
would say, “I don’t know. In fact I am in a constant state of amazement that the 
Conference speech ever does get written.”’45 Similarly, Alastair Campbell’s diaries 
testify to the chaotic and frenzied atmosphere that surrounded the drafting of Blair’s 
conference speeches.
46
 The evidence suggests that prime ministers are right to submit 
themselves to the stress of the process. Brown’s 2008 speech was widely billed as a 
last chance to save his leadership. His comparatively strong performance appeared to 
put paid to the possibility of a challenge from within the party. In general, however, 
Brown serves as an example of how some prime ministers (another example is 
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Edward Heath) have been weakened by poor rhetorical/communication skills, a trait 
often portrayed in the media as a lack of ‘warmth’ or charisma. 
 
Prime ministerial rhetoric and ‘national’ values 
Thus far, we have mainly considered rhetoric as a method for prime ministers to win 
and hold onto power rather then as a means to secure specific policy goals. The two 
things are of course related, given that a prime minister who is popular both nationally 
and within the party will find it easier to get his or her way on difficult topics. Yet it is 
clearly crucial for prime ministers to address concrete issues, with a view to shifting 
the climate of opinion. In the late nineteenth century, British politicians such as 
Palmerston and Gladstone used speeches to bring public opinion to bear upon 
parliament.
47
 But in the years that followed, party leaders gained increased control of 
their MPs, rendering this tactic decreasingly necessary. This is a significant difference 
between the rhetorical premiership as practiced recently in Britain and the rhetorical 
presidency in the United States. A prime minister can only stay in power so long as he 
or she commands the confidence of the Commons. As the executive is drawn from the 
legislature, the possibility of office is an inducement to MPs to toe the government 
line. In the USA, the separation of powers creates a different dynamic. A president 
may well face a hostile or unbiddable Congress, and cannot hold out the lure of office 
in the same way. In this situation he (or perhaps someday she) may seek to appeal to 
the voters over the heads of Congress, as in Woodrow Wilson’s failed bid to secure 
support for the League of Nations, or in President Obama’s recent efforts to generate 
support for his domestic policies. This may well mean trying to generate pressure on 
lawmakers within their own party as well as those of the opposition. Post-1945 prime 
ministers have not needed to use public opinion in quite this way.
48
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Rather, prime ministers’ rhetoric has served different, but often inter-related 
functions. First, they have used it to present themselves as national leaders, 
transcending party. (Williamson has shown this for Baldwin in the earlier period.) The 
clash between Attlee and Churchill at the 1945 election, for example, was in part a 
debate over which of them could lay claim to British values and over which side was 
most representative of the nation as a whole. Churchill, whose short-lived ‘caretaker’ 
government included Liberals and non-party men as well as Conservatives, claimed 
the ‘support of all throughout the country who sincerely put the nation first in their 
thoughts.’ He added ‘This is a National Government.’49 Attlee carefully distinguished 
‘between Winston Churchill, the great leader in war of a united nation, and Mr. 
Churchill, the party leader of the Conservatives.’ He further argued that not only was 
the government a Conservative one, but the Conservative Party was ‘a class Party’ 
which had rarely drawn any MPs from ‘the ranks of the wage-earners’ and continued 
to represent ‘property and privilege’. Moreover, the Labour party was ‘the one party 
which most nearly reflects in its representation and composition all the main streams 
which flow into the great river of our national life.’50 
 
Many other instances could be given, from Wilson and Blair’s respective efforts to 
associate themselves with visions of a progressive, technologically dynamic nation, to 
Major’s evocation of Britain as a land of cricket grounds, warm beer, and old maids 
bicycling to holy communion through the morning mist. To adapt Benedict 
Anderson’s terminology, prime ministers (and other politicians) imagine 
communities, and then depict themselves in their speeches as uniquely qualified to 
lead them.
51
 Doing this successfully may well form a key to winning elections, and a 
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prime minister who seems likely to win the next election will most likely be secure 
from challenge from within his or her own party. The technique may also help when 
dealing with specific crises. The psychologists Stephen Reicher and Nicolas Hopkins, 
who have analysed the rhetoric of Thatcher and the Labour leader Neil Kinnock 
during the 1984-5 miners’ strike, argue that ‘both speakers construe the nature of the 
event such that their party is representative of an ingroup which encompasses almost 
the entire population and such that their policies are consonant with the definition of 
the ingroup identity.’52 Put more simply, both Thatcher and Kinnock defined their 
own values as national values and then defined their opponents as transgressors 
against these. On the face of it, it would seem that Thatcher was the more successful 
of the two, given public attitudes both to the strike and to the two leaders at the time.
53
 
The contribution that her rhetoric made to the defeat of the miners’ strike is of course 
unquantifiable. We may surmise, however, that prime ministers believe that they 
derive benefits from speaking out on such issues, and know that they risk being 
heavily criticised if they avoid commenting on issues of perceived national 
importance. 
 
The very fact of being prime minister gives the occupant of 10 Downing Street 
advantages that do not accrue to leaders of the opposition, especially those ones who 
have never held the office. Prime Ministers’ involvement in international affairs gives 
them a platform for speaking in a way which may also bring them domestic 
advantages. A prime minister speaking abroad will normally do so as an honoured 
guest at a prestigious event and venue. He or she is unlikely to be directly challenged 
by the hosts, and may well enjoy genuine foreign policy successes that those out of 
power cannot emulate. (It was said of Thatcher that the further one got from Britain, 
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the more she was admired.)  Perhaps the most famous example is that of Macmillan, 
who liked to present himself as a world statesman above the ‘little local difficulties’ 
posed by domestic politics.
54
 This is not to say that speeches abroad are necessarily 
easy ones to make. In his ‘winds of change’ speech to the South African parliament in 
1960, Macmillan faced the challenge of satisfying those in Britain who wanted him to 
criticise the Apartheid system, whilst at the same avoiding provoking the South 
Africans into leaving the Commonwealth.
55
 As he wrote in his diary afterwards, ‘I 
had to comfort those [South Africans] of British descent; inspire the Liberals; satisfy 
home opinion; and yet keep on good terms – at least outwardly – with the strange 
caucus of Africaner politicians who now control this vast country.’56 In a rhetorical 
tour de force, he succeeded in challenging the supporters of Apartheid without 
insulting them, helping to cement his position both at home and abroad. 
 
Agenda-setting and rhetorical failure 
Macmillan’s private secretary later argued that the ‘winds of change’ speech 
contained ‘nothing startling or novel’, noting that one of the most effective passages 
was a quotation from a speech made by the foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, at the 
United Nations the previous year.
57
 What Macmillan achieved, then, was not policy 
change, but policy definition. His speech struck a chord in a way that Lloyd’s did not. 
This was in part a product of the unique context in which it was delivered and in part 
a consequence of his special authority as prime minister. This potential power to set 
the political agenda is not of course restricted to prime ministers, but they are more 
likely than others to be able to exercise it. For example, the sentiments in Callaghan’s 
speech on educational standards at Ruskin College 1976 would surely have drawn 
significantly less attention had they come from any lesser minister. Although his 
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criticisms of modern teaching methods did not lead to any immediate shift in policy, 
the speech is generally seen as having helped trigger the subsequent adoption of the 
national curriculum in schools. Twenty years later, he was able to reflect that the 
concerns he had expressed had become staples of political debate.
58
 Arguably, this 
sort of reflection on grand themes is a task for which the premiership is ideally suited. 
Speeches of this nature may have more impact in the longer run than do multiple 
interventions aimed at the micro-management of particular immediate issues. 
 
Above all, rhetoric can enable prime ministers to set the tone of their governments, for 
good or ill. One Mass-Observation diarist, for example, commented after a speech by 
Attlee that ‘The more I hear the man, the better I like him. Sober, calm, dignified, just 
what we need for this time of pulling up our socks.’59 An entire era was encapsulated 
by the 1957 speech in which Macmillan declared, ‘Let’s be frank about it; most of our 
people have never had it so good.’60 (It is true that he went on to warn about the 
dangers of inflation, so the speech cannot be seen as a simple celebration of 
affluence.
61
 He was, in fact, sending out a double message: on the one hand, seeking 
credit for the rising living standards of the 1950s and, on the other, presenting himself 
as a prophet of economic responsibility.) The reassuring tone of Callaghan worked 
well for some time, but, as industrial conflict mounted in 1978-9, he risked looking 
complacent. Although he never actually said the words in question, the Sun headline 
‘Crisis? What Crisis?’ appeared a politically fatal summation of his attitude.62 
Thatcher’s strident and uncompromising tone (encapsulated by the ‘not for turning’ 
speech) alienated many, but its advantages were crystal clear. The frequent 
observation that ‘you may not like her, but you know where you are with her’ was a 
testament to the reluctant admiration she often compelled. Tony Blair’s almost 
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messianic speech to the 2001 Labour party helped define the 11 September terrorist 
attacks as ‘a turning point in history’ – and in his own premiership.63 
 
The rhetorical premiership is crucially important at such times. The entire cold war 
period, of course, represented an ongoing crisis. Prime ministers (and foreign 
secretaries) faced a tough balancing act. They needed to be seen to take a firm line, 
and to prepare the British people for the possibility of a long and arduous struggle, but 
they had to do so without needlessly antagonising the Soviet bloc or closing the door 
on the possibility of détente. It is notable that the most significant rhetorical cold war 
landmark, Churchill’s 1946 ‘iron curtain’ speech, was actually delivered by an ex-
prime minister. Whilst his personal reputation lent considerable weight to his words, 
Attlee and his foreign secretary Ernest Bevin, who had not been consulted in advance, 
avoided official comment, sheltering behind the fact that Churchill was, strictly 
speaking, merely a private citizen delivering a speech in the USA. Attlee, who did not 
feel able to speak out in a similar way at the time, was probably grateful to Churchill 
for what he said, once he had been reassured that President Truman approved of the 
speech.
64
 This suggests some limitations on prime ministerial rhetoric: just as some 
things may only gain attention if a prime minister says them, there may be others that 
prime ministers in office are unable to say. 
 
Churchill’s speeches in 1940 were of course crucial in rallying the nation and – 
although he did not care for this idea himself – were perhaps his most significant 
contribution to winning the war. Since then there has been neither a comparable war 
nor comparable speeches. Nevertheless, prime ministerial rhetoric has played a role in 
post-1945 military conflicts. There is reason to believe that rhetoric can be helpful in 
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shifting public opinion. On the basis of polling evidence, Paul Baines and Robert 
Worcester make the following argument with regard to Iraq in 2003: ‘Contrary to the 
commonly held notion that politicians follow public opinion […] a UK Prime 
Minister managed to persuade, through various rhetorical devices and a complicit 
media, an initially sceptical electorate that a war with Iraq, in conjunction with the 
USA, was in the country’s best interests.’65 There are, however, significant limits to 
the power of rhetoric. After the Iraq war, further fluent Blair speeches were 
insufficient to rebuild public trust in the face of the failure to find weapons of mass 
destruction. Earlier, Eden’s broadcast at the start of the Suez war was ‘one of the best 
speeches of his life’, but the diplomatic consequences of the military action were 
catastrophic.
66
 Conversely, Thatcher’s rhetoric did not win the Falklands war – but it 
did help her associate herself with the victory, to her immense political profit. 
 
Finally, in considering the impact of the rhetorical premiership, we need to consider 
the importance of rhetorical failure. Poor rhetoric can help doom a premiership, just 
as strong rhetoric can enhance one. Churchill’s ‘Gestapo’ speech may have 
contributed to his loss of the 1945 election; Wilson’s ‘pound in your pocket’ 
devaluation broadcast may not have been utterly fatal, but it was a sign that he was 
losing his touch. Some rhetorical calamities, such as Blair’s speech to members of the 
Women’s Institute in 2000, have been the product of simple misjudgement. A speech 
which would have been unexceptional had it been given to another audience was 
judged too overtly political by his listeners, and he was interrupted by slow hand-
clapping. Some other disasters may have been a symptom of underlying political 
difficulties rather than the cause of them. One of the last nails in Thatcher’s coffin 
prior to her political down-fall in 1990 was the Commons speech in which she set her 
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face against further measures of European integration: ‘No. No. No.’67 The style that 
had once appeared as an admirable firmness now struck many as mere intransigence, 
and within weeks her own MPs had forced her from No. 10. Certain kinds of silence 
may also be considered as contributing to broad rhetorical failure. To take Blair again: 
it seems that after his victory in the 2001 election, he seriously intended to begin 
speaking out in favour of British entry to the single European currency, prior to a 
referendum on the issue around the middle of the parliament. According to Alastair 
Campbell, ‘He really believed we could turn the debate.’68 Yet when it came to the 
point he shied away from committing himself in public, and the referendum never 
occurred. It is by no means clear that a powerful rhetorical commitment by him could 
have swung opinion in favour of the Euro; it is however certain that his failure to 
make such a commitment guaranteed that entry would not take place. 
 
Conclusion 
Where, then, does this leave the debate on prime ministerial power? The existence of 
the rhetorical premiership could give a degree of comfort to both the 
‘presidentialisation’ and the ‘chairmanship’ schools. Foley argues that the modern 
‘emphasis upon public leadership in public arenas, which is now strong enough to 
politicise the most mundane of official engagements, has very clear parallels with the 
contemporary condition of the American presidency.’69 The evidence presented here 
of the increased frequency of prime ministerial extra-parliamentary speech might be 
thought to bear this out, although, as has been suggested here, there are reasons to be 
cautious when making the parallel with the US. On the other hand, the ‘chairmanship’ 
model rightly emphasises the prime minister’s need to persuade.70 This is generally 
couched in terms of the need to convince ministerial colleagues, a point that is also 
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highly relevant if we accept the model that emphasises the interdependence of senior 
actors. Rhetorical skills are a potential resource on which any of the actors can draw, 
whether they are trying to persuade each other directly or are trying to get other 
groups (and public opinion more broadly) on their side.  Whether or not prime 
ministerial rhetoric is considered ‘presidential’, it is undoubtedly – together with other 
communications techniques - an indispensable tool of governance. As Bernard 
Donoughue, head of the Downing Street policy unit, wrote of Wilson in 1975: 
 
He sees politics through speeches – reading facts into the record; committing 
himself and his government in public in advance so he can alter refer back to 
what he said earlier; perhaps to prevent himself from weakening and retreating 
later; attacking people he does not like. […] Most of his political life has been 
spent rhetorically – in Opposition inevitably, and in government as leader, 
without a department.
71
 
 
Rhetoric may have been more important to Wilson than to some other prime 
ministers, and it is not, of course, a substitute for action. It has, however, been central 
to the way that the modern premiership has operated. 
 
How, then, is the rhetorical premiership best studied? There is much that can be learnt 
from American scholarship on presidential rhetoric, provided that scholars are 
sensitive to the institutional and cultural differences that affect how political language 
is delivered and received. It is important to analyse texts closely, if necessary 
employing the terminology of classical rhetoric to identify the different parts of 
speech. (This is not an end in itself, but the results can be thought-provoking.) This is 
not a licence to avoid the archive, however. Where they are preserved, the 
examination of variant drafts, and associated notes and memoranda, may allow for a 
rich understanding of the speechwriting process. Above all, scholars should be careful 
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not to read into modern rhetorical developments a story of deterioration, in which 
technology plays the role of the villain. Before World War I, Lord Curzon cautioned 
against superficial explanations of ‘the apparent decline of British eloquence’. He 
argued:  
 
The reason is not that a particular fountain of human genius has been dried at 
its source, never again to be revived, but that it flows into new channels, and 
irrigates a fresh soil. Or, if the metaphor be varied, men’s souls are still 
capable of being set on fire by the spoken word; but the spark is otherwise 
kindled, and it lights a less radiant and consuming flame.
72
 
 
The rhetorical premiership, we may to deduce, will continue to evolve, just as it has 
since 1945. In order to fully understand prime ministerial power, we need to be alive 
to the sparks that it has so often kindled. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Prime ministerial speech in parliament, 1946-2008 
 
Source: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ 
 
 
Prime Minister Month / Year Number of days on which 
PM spoke in Parliament 
Oral contributions by 
PM in Parliament 
Attlee Mar-46 16 82 
Churchill Mar-52 11 82 
Eden Mar-56 13 99 
Macmillan Mar-58 8 163 
Douglas-Home Mar-64 9 140 
Wilson Mar-65 9 223 
Heath Mar-71 11 222 
Callaghan Mar-77 11 210 
Thatcher Mar-80 8 118 
Major Mar-91 7 162 
Blair Mar-98 4 113 
Brown Mar-08 5 159 
 
 
 
Table 2: Prime ministerial extra-parliamentary speech,1946-2008 
 
Sources: The Times (Times Digital Archive/Nexis UK);  www.margaretthatcher.org; 
www.number10.gov.uk 
 
 
Prime Minister Month / Year Episodes of extra-
parliamentary speech 
Attlee Mar-46 3 
Churchill Mar-52 0 
Eden Mar-56 3 
Macmillan Mar-58 3 
Douglas-Home Mar-64 12 
Wilson Mar-65 2 
Heath Mar-71 9 
Callaghan Mar-77 7 
Thatcher Mar-80 13 
Major Mar-91 7+* 
Blair Mar-98 8 
Brown Mar-08 23 
 
*The Times of 4 March 1991 reported that Major had given a series of interviews to 
Soviet journalists based in London. These have been counted here as one 
contribution. 
 
Keywords: rhetoric, prime ministers, British constitution, speechmaking, oratory. 
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